Cookies on this website
We use cookies to ensure that we give you the best experience on our website. If you click 'Continue' we'll assume that you are happy to receive all cookies and you won't see this message again. Click 'Find out more' for information on how to change your cookie settings.
Skip to main content

This paper considers whether lawyers, acting as agents, respond to financial incentives which are extraneous to their clients' requirements. We take as a case study lawyers performing legal aid work in England and Wales. An empirical model of legal aid expenditure variations across areas in relation to changes in the demand for conveyancing services and the structure of the industry is estimated using dynamic panel data methods. The results may help to explain rising government legal aid expenditure in recent years.

Type

Journal article

Journal

Oxford Economic Papers

Publication Date

01/01/1999

Volume

51

Pages

545 - 558